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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
[1] Big Brand Name develops and files a patent for a drug that kills 
bacteria in an innovative way.  The drug is groundbreaking and potentially 
marketable, so Big Brand Name incurs the enormous cost (estimated at 
$868 million) and time of drug discovery research and safety 
determinations of clinical trials to bring the drug to market.1  Small 
Generic Company wants to sell the same drug but must wait until Big 
Brand Name’s patent expires or, in the alternative, Small Generic 
Company can file an Abbreviated New Drug Application (“ANDA”) with 
the FDA and allege Big Brand Name’s patent is invalid or the patent does 
not cover Small Generic Company’s Drug.2  Filing an ANDA application 
is an attractive option for Small Generic Company because it can market 
and sell the same drug for a fraction of Big Brand Name’s development 
                                                 
* Scott Bergeson is a patent agent with a chemical engineering background and recent 
graduate of the University of Richmond School of Law.  He would like to thank 
Professor Kristen Osenga for her invaluable guidance in publishing this article. 
 
1 See Christopher Adams & Van Brantner, Estimating the Cost of New Drug 
Development: Is it Really $802 Million?, 25 HEALTH AFFAIRS 420, 420, 424 (2006). 
 
2 See Andrew A. Caffrey, III & Jonathan M. Rotter, Consumer Protection, Patents and 
Procedure: Generic Drug Market Entry and the Need to Reform the Hatch-Waxman Act, 
9 VA. J.L. & TECH. 1, 6–7 (2004). 
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and clinical trial cost.3  Thus, Small Generic Company files an ANDA 
application, stating the relevant patent (Big Brand Name’s patent) is 
invalid or their drug does not infringe the relevant patent.4  The ANDA 
application allows Small Generic Company to bypass the expensive 
clinical trials.5 
 
[2] The ANDA application filed by Small Generic Company provides 
Big Brand Name with standing to sue for patent infringement.6  Big Brand 
Name files suit.7  Small Generic Company files a counter-claim asserting 
Big Brand Name’s patent is invalid.  Instead of risking Big Brand Name’s 
patent and loss of its temporary monopoly on the drug and the 
accompanying large profits, Big Brand Name pays Small Generic 
Company nearly $400 million to drop their invalidity counter-claim and 
refrain from entering the market.8  Big Brand Name would rather share 
some of its monopoly profits with Small Generic Company and keep 
competition at bay than risk the invalidity of its patent and the end of its 
monopoly profits.  Interestingly, Small Generic Company may have only 
earned $200 million from marketing and selling the drug on its own.9  
                                                 
3 See id. at 6. 
 
4 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV) (2006); see, e.g., In re Ciprofloxacin 
Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 
5 See FTC, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT EXPIRATION: AN FTC STUDY, 5 
(2002), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/07/genericdrugstudy.pdf. 
 
6 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2) (2006). 
 
7 If Big Brand Name does not file suit within forty-five days of the ANDA filing date, 
then Big Brand Name does not trigger the 30-month stay provision preventing FDA 
approval of Small Generic’s ANDA application.  See 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(3)(C) (2006). 
 
8 See, e.g., Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Louisiana Wholesale Drug Co. v. Bayer AG, 
131 S. Ct. 1606 (2011) (No. 10-762), 2010 WL 5014323 *7-8; In re Ciprofloxacin, 544 
F.3d at 1329 & n.5.  
 
9 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Louisiana Wholesale Drug Co., Inc., 131 S. Ct 1606 
(No. 10-762), 2010 WL 5014323 *7-8. 
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Therefore, Small Generic Company earned $298 million more by settling 
than it could from selling the drug.10 
 
[3] This can result in an interesting predicamenta generic 
pharmaceutical company obtaining more money from a lawsuit settlement 
than the same company could stand to earn from manufacturing and 
selling the drug.11  Scholars and practitioners call this a reverse payment 
because Big Brand Name originally sued Small Generic Company as the 
plaintiff.12  In most litigation settlements, the defendant pays the plaintiff 
to drop the suit.13  This is the reverse situation—the plaintiff, Big Brand 
Name, pays the defendant, Small Generic Company, to drop the counter-
claim.14  As part of the settlement, the generic company agrees to not enter 
the market with the drug until the brand name company’s patent expires.15 
 
[4] This type of settlement is troubling because Congress’s purpose in 
enacting the ANDA legislation was to encourage competition in the 
pharmaceutical realm, not stifle it.16  Generic drug companies are market 
competitors with brand name drug companies in the pharmaceutical 
                                                 
10 See id. 
 
11 See id. 
 
12 See Christopher Holman, Do Reverse Payment Settlements Violate the Antitrust Laws?, 
23 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 489, 494 (2007) (defining reverse 
payments as “a variety of diverse patent settlement agreements that involve a transfer of 
consideration from the patent owner to the alleged infringer . . . [T]he patent owner 
agrees to provide some compensation to the alleged infringer, and the alleged infringer 
agrees to delay developing or marketing a product”). 
 
13 See id. 
 
14 See, e.g., In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323, 1328–29 
(Fed. Cir. 2008) (explaining the patent owner paid the alleged infringer and generic 
company $398.1 million to drop its counter-claim and delay entry into the market). 
 
15 See id. 
 
16 H.R. REP. NO. 98-857(I), at 14–15 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, 
2647–48. 
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market.  Generic companies must enter the market to compete.  Congress 
tried to encourage more generic companies to enter the market by 
providing two significant incentives: a faster approval system for 
pharmaceutical competitors marketing previously approved FDA drugs17 
and the reward of a temporary monopoly to the first generic filer that 
challenges a bad patent through this faster filing process.18  However, 
Congress’s competitive purpose is thwarted by the reverse payment 
settlements because it involves generic companies agreeing to not enter 
the market.  Worst yet, when reverse payments are combined with the 
180-day exclusivity provision, other potential competitors are prevented 
from entering the market.19  
 
[5] This article identifies two problems with reverse payment 
settlements.  One problem stems from Congress’s well-intended, but 
incomplete, incentives from the Hatch-Waxman Act.20  One incentive 
intended to encourage competition between brand name companies and 
generic companies may actually prevent competition when companies 
enter reverse payment agreements.  The second problem is with the courts’ 
analyses of reverse payment agreements.  The courts’ analyses of reverse 
payment agreements are inconsistent, and some are misguided.21   
 
                                                 
17 Compare 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1) (2006) (explaining that a drug under the new drug 
application must show, among many other things, full reports of investigations whether 
the drug is safe and effective), with 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A) (stating that a drug under 
the abbreviated new drug application must show that it has the same active ingredient as 
a previously approved drug). 
 
18 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(b)(iv). 
 
19 See Holman, supra note 12, at 494.  
 
20 See C. Scott Hemphill & Mark A. Lemley, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 947, 947–48 (2011) 
(describing why the Hatch-Waxman Act’s quasi-exclusive rights are insufficient 
incentives for holders of generic patents). 
 
21 See, e.g., In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896, 900 (6th Cir. 2003) (this 
author believes that the Sixth Circuit’s holding that the plaintiff’s decision to enter into a 
reverse payment agreement means the patent is per se invalid is not the right 
determination or analysis for reverse payment cases).  
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[6] To ensure that the proper balance of competition and innovation 
thrives in the pharmaceutical industry, Congress must address both 
problems.  Congress must amend the Hatch-Waxman Act to provide 
proper incentives to qualifying generic companies, which would prevent 
many reverse payments from forming.  Specifically, Congress needs to 
reward a second generic patent challenger with a temporary monopoly 
incentive if the first fails to utilize the incentive.  In addition, Congress 
must detail a uniform reverse payment agreement analysis to properly 
determine whether reverse payment agreements are anticompetitive.  
Without an amendment to the Hatch-Waxman Act removing an 
unintended approval roadblock for generic drug competitors, many 
anticompetitive reverse payment agreements will continue to form.  
Without a proper uniform ex post court analysis, courts cannot 
appropriately police the reverse payment agreements that are 
anticompetitive.  Thus, Congress must fix both. 
 
[7] Section II describes the balance Congress struck between 
innovation and competition in the pharmaceutical industry.  Specifically, 
this section describes the two Hatch-Waxman incentives aimed at 
encouraging competition and making available lower price drugs.  Section 
III explains how companies enter reverse payment agreements and how 
these agreements undermine Congress’s balancing act.  Section IV 
examines how courts have analyzed the anticompetitive nature of reverse 
payments.  Of the three primary modes, one court’s reasoning is the most 
sound.  However, even a proper court analysis or a new Senate bill 
codifying this analysis is ineffective alone in preventing anticompetitive 
reverse payments from forming.  Section V proposes a legislative 
amendment to the 180-day exclusivity incentive for Congress to 
discourage companies from forming anticompetitive reverse payment 
agreements to start with.  Only when Congress combines the amendment 
with the proper ex post analyses of these agreements by the courts can we 
have an effective solution to ensure the agreements are not 
anticompetitive. 
 
II.  CONGRESS’S DELICATE BALANCE: HATCH-WAXMAN INCENTIVES TO 
ENCOURAGE INNOVATION AND COMPETITION 
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[8] Congress believes that consumers need innovation delicately 
balanced with competition in the pharmaceutical industry because both are 
important.22  Competition is needed to help reduce drug prices for 
consumers.23  Innovation is needed to create new life saving drugs.24  
Unfortunately, without proper incentives, competition will take 
precedence at the expense of innovation, or vice versa.  Competition in the 
pharmaceutical industry creates lower priced drugs, but it comes at the 
cost of less innovation.25  Too much competition would stifle innovation 
and starve the world of new life saving drugs.26  However, a lack of 
competition between drug companies would keep drug prices high, 
thereby making them inaccessible to many who need them the most.27 
 
[9] Recognizing this, Congress enacted the Hatch-Waxman Act to 
encourage competition in pharmaceuticals without sacrificing 
innovation.28  The Hatch-Waxman Act encourages innovation by allowing 
patent holders to extend the life of their patent monopoly beyond the 
                                                 
22 See H.R. REP. NO. 98-857(I), at 14–15 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, 
2647–48; Holman, supra note 12, at 513. 
 
23 See FTC STUDY, supra note 5, at 9. 
 
24 Albert Wertheimer &Thomas Santella, The History and Economics of Pharmaceutical 
Patents, in 16 RESEARCH IN HUMAN CAPITAL AND DEVELOPMENT, THE VALUE OF 
INNOVATION: IMPACT OF HEALTH, LIFE QUALITY, SAFETY, AND REGULATORY RESEARCH 
101, 102 (Irina Farquhar et al. eds., 2008). 
 
25 See Carmelo Giaccotto, Rexford Santerre & John Vernon, Drug Prices and Research 
and Development Investment Behavior in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 48 J.L. & ECON. 
195, 212 (2005). 
 
26 See id. 
 
27 See Patricia Danzon, Making Sense of Drug Prices, 23 REGULATION 56, 58 (2006), 
available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/regv23n1/danzon.pdf. 
 
28 See H.R. REP. NO. 98-857(I), at 14 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, 2647 
(describing the purpose of the bill is to increase the number of generic drug); id. at 39 
(explaining that new and important innovation should be rewarded). 
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normal patent life of twenty years.29  The Hatch-Waxman Act encourages 
competition by creating a less expensive FDA approval process for 
generic drugs,30 and providing the first generic patent challenger with a 
first mover advantage against other generics.31  However, when Congress 
created the incentives to balance innovation and competition they failed to 
realize that the incentives encouraged pharmaceutical companies to enter 
into reverse payment agreements.32  These reverse payment agreements 
between patent-holding pharmaceutical companies and ANDA filers upset 
Congress’s competition-innovation balance.33  One incentive, in particular 
the 180-day exclusivity, established a roadblock to the very competition 
that Congress intended to create.34 
 
A.  Innovation versus Competition 
 
[10] Competition encourages lower prices for medicine, but in the 
pharmaceutical industry, it may decrease innovation.35  The first company 
to create a new drug and file for a patent has a competitive advantage due 
to the inherent monopoly rights granted with the patent.36  A second 
company, or generic company, invests a smaller amount of money than 
                                                 
29 35 U.S.C. § 156 (2006). 
 
30 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2006). 
 
31 See id; 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(i)-(iv) (providing the first generic patent challenger 
with a 180-day exclusivity against other generics). 
 
32 See Hemphill & Lemley, supra note 20, at 947-48.  See generally H.R. REP. NO. 98-
857(I), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647. 
 
33 See Holman, supra note 12, at 506. 
 
34 Hemphill & Lemley, supra note 20, at 947-48. 
 
35 See Giaccotto, Santerre & Vernon, supra note 25, at 212. 
 
36 See Wendy H. Schacht & John R. Thomas, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30756, PATENT 
LAW AND ITS APPLICATION TO THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY: AN EXAMINATION OF 
THE DRUG PRICE COMPETITION AND PATENT TERM RESTORATION ACT OF 1984 (“THE 
HATCH-WAXMAN ACT”) 12-14 (2005).  
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the first, by copying the first company’s drug through the ANDA 
process.37  Therefore, the generic company can sell the same drug at a 
lower, but still profitable, price.  A generic company’s substantially lower 
drug development costs leads to an increase in the number of generic 
competitors in the market.38  As generic competitors enter the market, the 
inventing company’s market share declines resulting in fewer profits.39  
Because the inventing company makes fewer profits, it has less of an 
incentive to continue inventing new drugs, decreasing innovation.40  
 
[11] Some commentators note, however, that companies with an 
established market presence have no incentive to truly innovate and 
instead pool resources to maintain their market dominance.41  Thomas 
Piraino wrote that some economic studies show monopolists conduct less 
research and innovation than companies in competitive markets.42  
However, in the same article he states that economic studies conclude that 
competition in innovation is “more critical to long-term economic 
efficiency than is price competition.”43  He notes that continuous 
                                                 
37 See Holman, supra note 12, at 511. 
 
38 See id. at 510–11. 
 
39 See id; Generic Competition and Drug Prices, FDA.GOV, 
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/ 
OfficeofMedicalProductsandTobacco/CDER/ucm129385.htm (last visited Dec. 5, 2011). 
 
40 See CBO, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 45, 
available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/76xx/doc7615/10-02-DrugR-D.pdf; see, e.g., F. 
M. Scherer, Pricing, Profits, and Technological Progress in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 
7 J. ECON. PERSP. 97, 105 (1993).  
 
41 See Thomas Piraino, Identifying Monopolists’ Illegal Conduct Under the Sherman Act, 
75  N.Y.U. L. REV. 809, 814-15 (2000); Douglass Ginsburg, Antitrust, Uncertainty, and 
Technological Innovation, 24 ANTITRUST BULL. 635, 649 (1979); Mark Green, Have the 
Antitrust Law Promised Too Much and Accomplished Too Little? Answer: Yes, 46 
ANTITRUST L.J. 752, 755 (1977). 
 
42 See Piraino, supra note 41, at 815. 
 
43 Id. 
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innovation is important because it decreases prices of goods and expands 
the number of goods for consumers.44  He provides the example of 
Microsoft, which used its market dominance to stifle innovation in 
operating systems and other similar software.45  
 
[12] As Mr. Piraino states innovation provides more benefits to the 
market than price competition.46  Mr. Piraino admits that innovation is 
more critical than price competition.47  He is merely worried about 
companies who sit on their innovations without contributing to new 
ones.48  He specifies that continued innovation is the highest level of 
importance to consumers because it increases the number of new products 
on the market.49  Our market system should favor innovation because 
gains from innovation can be significantly greater than gains from 
competition.50  Innovation can create jobs, new industries, and new 
products.51  Patents encourage innovation and should be favored over 
                                                 
44 See id. 
 
45 See id. 
 
46 See id.  
 
47 Piraino, supra note 41 at 815. 
 
48 See id. 
 
49 See id. 
 
50 See Michael A. Carrier, Unraveling the Patent-Antitrust Paradox, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 
761, 833 (2002); Herbert Hovenkamp, The Monopolization Offense, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 
1035, 1045 (2000); Neelie Kroes, Op-Ed, Why Microsoft Was Wrong, WALL ST. J. EUR., 
Sept. 26, 2007 at 13 (“Where a well-established monopolist exploits its position to 
colonize neighboring markets, this can scare investors from funding competitors, 
undermine the incentive and ability of those competitors to invest and innovate, and drive 
out competitors who are as efficient as the monopolist.  And monopolists exploiting their 
strategic position to conquer new markets are less likely to innovate than companies 
forced to compete for customers on the basis of the merits of their products.”). 
 
51 See A Strategy for American Innovation: Driving Towards Sustainable Growth and 
Quality Jobs, NAT’L ECON. COUNCIL (Sept. 2009), available at http://www. 
whitehouse.gov/administration/eop/nec/StrategyforAmericanInnovation. 
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competition.52  In addition to the benefits of innovation over competition, 
in medicine, innovation can save lives.53  Thus, when balancing is not an 
option, Congress should err on the side of over-rewarding innovation.54   
 
B.  Hatch-Waxman Incentives for Generics 
  
[13] The Hatch-Waxman Act provides, among other things, two 
incentives to generic drug manufacturers to compete with brand name 
manufacturers.55  First, the Act creates the ANDA process, which permits 
generic manufacturers to forgo the onerous clinic trials required in typical 
new drug applications if the generic manufacturer can show the FDA its 
drug is bioequivalent to an existing approved drug. 56  Second, the Act 
provides a temporary 180-day monopoly to the first generic manufacturer 
to file an application challenging the brand name manufacturer’s patent 
through the ANDA process.57 
 
                                                                                                                         
 
52 But see Berlin Packaging, LLC v. Stull Techs., Inc., 381 F. Supp. 2d 792, 796 (N.D. Ill. 
2005) (“[I]n patent law, the purpose is to encourage innovation while inviting 
competition; the recipient of a patent is granted a monopoly for a limited time, after 
which the innovation passes to the public for copying and improvement.”). 
 
53 See Brief for Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Respondent, Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs. Inc., (U.S. 
2011) (No. 10-1150), 2011 WL 5373698 at *22.  
 
54 See id. at *23 (describing pharmaceutical patents as “critical to spurring innovation that 
will save or improve countless lives. . . . [w]ithout the promise of protection that will 
enable recoupment of the enormous investment that goes into development of these 
processes, the development will not be undertaken”). 
 
55 See generally 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2006) (providing the ways in which abbreviated 
applications may be filed). 
 
56 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(iv). 
 
57 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (defining the 180 day exclusivity period and 
explaining that the Secretary shall approve or disprove an application within 180 days). 
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1.  A Shorter Process: The Abbreviated New Drug 
Application 
 
[14] One way Congress encourages competition is through the ANDA 
process.58  Rather than going through the full-length approval process, 
generics can rely on brand names’ approval and enter the market quickly 
and cheaper than their brand name counter parts.59  This is obviously 
enticing for the competing drug companies because they can charge a 
lower price for a drug than the brand name and still earn a profit. 
 
[15] A brand name must incur a high cost for drug development and 
approval and thus has to charge a high price to obtain a return on its 
investment.60  First, the brand name spends money on discovering a 
drug.61  Then brand name spends money on filing for a patent on the 
drug.62  Then the company undergoes expensive clinical trials for the new 
drug as required by the FDA.63   
 
[16] A patent holder likely files for a patent once the drug is 
discovered.64  Once discovered, the patent holder must undergo arduous 
clinic trials to ensure that the drug is effective and safe for human 
consumption.65  The FDA regulates and requires clinical trials as a part of 
                                                 
58 See Holman, supra note 12, at 510. 
 
59 See id. at 510-11. 
 
60 See FTC STUDY, supra note 5, at 4. 
 
61 See id. 
 
62 See generally 21 U.S.C. § 355(b) (2006) (explaining the contents of a drug patent 
application). 
 
63 See id. 
 
64 See FTC STUDY, supra note 5, at 4. 
 
65 See generally 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1)(A) (2006) (describing the FDA’s review 
requirements). 
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the new drug application (“NDA”) process and requires many years to 
complete the testing.66  After the research, clinical trials, and full FDA 
approval, the brand name places the drug on the market using its patent to 
exploit its monopoly with higher prices to recoup investment costs. 
 
[17] In contrast, the ANDA filer has a shorter, less expensive route to 
market.67  The ANDA filer does not have to perform research and 
development to discover the drug nor does the ANDA filer need to 
perform clinic trials to show the drug is safe and effective.68  The ANDA 
filer may instead copy the patent holder’s drug, show that the new drug is 
the same as the patent holder’s, and file an ANDA application.69  In the 
ANDA application, the ANDA filer claims that their drug is bioequivalent 
to the patent holder’s drug.70  A company may show a drug is 
bioequivalent if it has the same active pharmaceutical ingredient (“API”) 
as an already FDA approved drug.71  The FDA approves an ANDA 
application in a short period because the patented drug already underwent 
studies to ensure it is safe and effective; the ANDA filer simply must 
show the FDA that its drug is the same.72  This shorter and less expensive 
process allows the ANDA filer to sell the same drug as the patent holder 
for a lower price because the ANDA filer incurred much lower costs to get 
to market. 
 
2.  The 180-Day Exclusivity Period 
                                                 
66 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(b). 
 
67 See NPS, Generic Medicines: Informing Patients About Multiple Brands, 
http://www.nps.org.au/health_professionals/publications/nps_news/current/generic_medi
cines_informing_patients (last visited Apr. 18, 2012). 
 
68 See Holman, supra note 12, at 511. 
 
69 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(ii)-(iv). 
 
70 See 21 U.S.C.§ 355(j)(2)(A)(iv). 
 
71 See id. 
 
72 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(i)-(viii). 
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[18] Congress also provided a temporary monetary incentive through a 
first mover advantage to encourage competition, but only to an ANDA 
filer that challenges a patent.73  An ANDA filer must make one of four 
certifications with respect to any related patents on the drug: (I) the related 
patent has not been filed on the drug; (II) the related patent has expired; 
(III) the related patent will expire soon; or, (IV) the related patent is 
invalid or will not be infringed by the new drug.74  This framework 
rewards the ANDA filer that makes the fourth certification to encourage 
generic companies to compete with brand name companies by challenging 
the latter’s patents.  
 
[19] Congress grants the first ANDA filer making a paragraph (IV) 
certification with a 180-day exclusivity period, making it the only generic 
seller of the drug.75  The first ANDA challenger is the only generic 
company in the market for a small period allowing it to maintain a high 
price and earning a high return on its drug manufacturing costs.76  It is not 
until the second generic drug enters market that major price erosion 
begins.77  In addition to the high short-term return on investment, the 180-
day exclusivity rewards the first ANDA challenger with the first mover 
advantage.78  This provides the challenger with the ability to establish 
itself in the marketplace, leading to more revenue opportunities for the 
generic company as the preferred generic alternative to consumers.79  
                                                 
73 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv). 
 
74 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(i)-(iv). 
 
75 See id. 
 
76 See Generic Competition and Drug Prices, supra note 39. 
 
77 See id. 
 
78 Aidan Hollis, The Importance of Being First: Evidence From Canadian Generic 
Pharmaceuticals, 11 HEALTH ECON. 723, 732-33 (2002). 
 
79 Marvin B. Lieberman & David B. Montgomery, First-Mover Advantages, 9 
STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 41, 44 (1988) (explaining that the first mover is able to preempt 
rivals to scarcities such as the shelf space in a pharmacy). 
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III.  HOW CONGRESS GOT SICK:  REVERSE PAYMENTS 
 
[20] Through the Hatch-Waxman Act, Congress tried to balance 
innovation and competition in the pharmaceutical industry, reverse 
payments upset this balance.80  Congress did not anticipate reverse 
payment agreements when drafting the Hatch-Waxman Act, particularly 
concerning its competitive incentives such as the 180-day exclusivity for 
the first ANDA challenger.81  Thus, unexpected consequences occurred.  
When these unique agreements combine with the 180-day exclusivity 
incentive it actually hinders competition instead of encourage it as 
Congress originally intended. 
 
[21] Reverse payment agreements result from a unique situation 
between a patent holder and a generic company.  First, a brand name drug 
company discovers a new drug and files for a patent and for FDA 
approval.82  The drug company receives a patent and eventually FDA 
approval.83  The drug company and now patent holder sells the drug for a 
high price because of the large cost the patent holder had to incur in 
discovering the drug and seeking FDA approval through the new drug 
application.84  Eventually a generic drug company decides to make the 
                                                 
80 See also William H. Rooney & Elai Katz et al., Review of Reverse-Payment 
Agreements: The Agencies, the Courts, Congress, and the European Commission, 5 
COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 122, 122 (Apr. 17, 2012, 7:45 PM), available at 
https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/review-of-reverse-payment-agreements-
the-agencies-the-courts-congress-and-the-european-commission/  See generally H.R. 
REP. NO. 98-857(I), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647. 
 
81 See generally Rooney & Katz et al., supra note 80 (describing how the Hatch-Waxman 
Act intended to foster innovation but resulted in the creation of reverse-payment 
agreements). 
 
82 See FTC STUDY, supra note 5, at 4. 
 
83 See id. at 5. 
 
84 See generally Hemphill & Lemley, supra note 20, at 951 (describing the testing and 
approval process required for the FDA is expensive and time consuming). 
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exact drug as the patent holder.85  Since the drug is not new, the generic 
company files an ANDA to obtain FDA approval.86  The ANDA filer 
must make a certified statement regarding why their drug will not affect 
related patents including the patent holder’s.87  The ANDA filer may state 
the related patent is invalid or that it does not infringe the related patent—
a paragraph (IV) certification.88  This provides the patent holder with a 
cause of action to sue the ANDA filer for patent infringement.89  Once 
sued, the ANDA filer will typically assert a counter-claim stating the 
patent is invalid.90  Instead of risking a judgment against that patent 
holder, invalidating or narrowing the patent’s scope, the patent holder 
settles with the ANDA filer.91  The patent holder has a larger risk—the 
end of highly lucrative monopoly profits—thus pays the ANDA filer to 
end litigation and refrain from entering the market with their generic 
drug.92  Because the patentee pays the infringer to settle the lawsuit, this is 
called a reverse payment.93 
 
[22] When the reverse payment is combined with the 180-day 
exclusivity incentive, a bottleneck for subsequent ANDA filers is formed 
and competition is hindered.  The 180-day exclusivity hinders competition 
                                                 
85 See FTC STUDY, supra note 5, at 4. 
 
86 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2006); FTC STUDY, supra note 5, at 4. 
 
87 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii). 
 
88 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV). 
 
89 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2) (2006). 
 
90 See, e.g., In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323, 1328 (Fed. 
Cir. 2008). 
 
91 See id. 
 
92 See id. at 1329. 
 
93 See id.. 
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if the first ANDA challenger does not execute its exclusivity.94  
Competition is hindered because the FDA will not grant subsequent filers 
approval until the first ANDA challenger uses the 180-day exclusivity 
period.95  This delay in approval discourages subsequent filers from filing 
an ANDA application or marketing a drug.96  The 180-day exclusivity is 
triggered when the first ANDA challenger markets the drug.97  Thus, 
when the ANDA challenger agrees to delay marketing in a reverse 
payment agreement, the challenger delays the start of the exclusivity 
period. 98  This delay blocks other generics from entering the marketplace 
until 180-days after the challenger begins to market the generic drug.99  
Through the agreement, the first ANDA challenger collects money from 
the patent holder and utilizes the 180-day exclusivity after the agreement 
concludes.100  This works great for the first ANDA challenger because it is 
able to collect a large sum of money without entering the market.101  In 
addition, once the agreement ends—usually many years later—the ANDA 
challenger may reap the benefits of the 180-day exclusivity period as a 
second payday. 
 
                                                 
94 See Shashank Upadhye, Triggering the 180-Day Exclusivity Clock Under the Post-
MMA Rules, GENERIC PHARMACEUTICAL PATENT AND FDA LAW, Feb. 2012, at § 13.9, 
available at WL GENPHARMA § 13:9. 
 
95 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (2006). 
 
96 If a potential subsequent generic filer learns that a prior generic has an exclusivity 
period that could be prevent the subsequent filer from FDA approval for an unknown 
period, the subsequent filer would likely forgo investment in that drug for another. 
 
97 See Upadhye, supra note 94, at § 13:9. 
 
98 See id. 
 
99 See id. 
 
100 See Hemphill & Lemley, supra note 20, at 948. 
 
101 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 7-8, Louisiana Wholesale Drug Co. v. Bayer AG, 
131 S. Ct. 1606 (2011) (No. 10-762), 2010 WL 5014323 at *7-8. 
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[23] Subsequent ANDA-filing generic drug companies have fewer 
incentives or no incentives because of the bottleneck to enter the market.  
Congress only provides the 180-day exclusivity provision to the first 
ANDA filer making a paragraph (IV) certification, regardless of whether 
or when the first filer utilizes the incentive.102  Later ANDA filers do not 
have the benefit of the 180-day exclusivity and are, in fact, prevented from 
obtaining FDA approval until the first ANDA filer exercises its 180-day 
exclusivity right.103  The main incentive for subsequent generic companies 
is the faster ANDA process, compared to the new drug application 
process.104  However, even this incentive is unavailable if a previous filer 
has the right to 180-day exclusivity.105  Without the first mover benefit 
and more importantly the delay of FDA approval due to prior filers with 
the 180-day exclusivity, subsequent filers have less incentives and a 
higher risk to enter the market. 
 
IV.  TREATING THE SYMPTOMS: CURRENT APPROACHES 
 
[24] Courts do not agree whether reverse payment agreements are 
anticompetitive and illegal, causing uncertainty about the validity of the 
agreements.106  Three different analyses have emerged.107  The Sixth 
Circuit views a reverse payment as evidence that a patent is not strong 
enough for the patent holder to exclude others, and thus, is per se 
anticompetitive.108  The Second Circuit relies on the presumption that a 
                                                 
102 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (2006). 
 
103 See id. 
 
104 See id. 
 
105 See id. 
 
106 See In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 212-13 (2d Cir. 2005); In 
re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896, 915 (6th Cir. 2003); Valley Drug Co. v. 
Geneva Pharm., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1309 (11th Cir. 2003). 
 
107 See In re Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 212-13; In re Cardizem, 332 F.3d at 915; Valley 
Drug, 344 F.3d at 1313. 
 
108 See In re Cardizem, 332 F.3d at 915. 
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patent is valid unless fraud was committed on the patent office. 109  
Because reverse payment agreements are based around the exclusionary 
right of a patent, they are presumptively valid and not anti-competitive.110  
The Eleventh Circuit uses a two-step process.111  The court determines the 
scope and strength of the disputed patent first and then analyzes whether 
the reverse payment settlement is anticompetitive based on the patent.112 
 
[25] Congress needs to supply the courts with the best approach.  Once 
the ANDA filer and patent holder reached an agreement, following an 
ANDA initiated patent infringement suit, the companies depend and plan 
future investments based on the agreement.  Companies cannot plan for 
the uncertainty surrounding validity of these agreements since the courts 
do not agree on which type of reverse payments are valid.  Companies are 
hesitant to invest in innovation when they have uncertainties in a 
significant portion of their budgets.113 
 
A.  Reverse Payments are Per Se Anticompetitive 
 
[26] The Sixth Circuit in In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litigation held 
that the reverse payment agreement at issue was anticompetitive and per 
se illegal. 114  The court determined that it must consider the strength of 
the patent when considering whether the reverse payment agreement is 
anticompetitive.115  The court reasoned that if the brand name’s patent 
                                                                                                                         
 
109 In re Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 212-13. 
 
110 See id. 
 
111 Valley Drug, 344 F.3d at 1313. 
 
112 Id. 
 
113 See Samuel Brittan, Question 1: Recovery, FIN. TIMES, (Jan. 2, 2012), 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/ab493aa2-353e-11e1-a4ab-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz1iLiTIsAX. 
 
114 In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896, 900 (6th Cir. 2003). 
 
115 See id. at 915. 
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were strong enough then it would not have paid the generic company to 
stay out of the market when the patent alone could have accomplished the 
same.116  Thus, the court ruled that the reverse payment, of nearly ninety 
million dollars, was so anticompetitive, it was per se illegal.117  The court 
also noted the agreement was anticompetitive because the ANDA filer 
held onto the 180-day exclusivity benefit without ending litigation 
between the companies.118  This prevented subsequent ANDA filers from 
obtaining FDA approval. 119  Without FDA approval, other generic 
companies could not enter the same drug market and led the court to 
determine the agreement was anticompetitive.120  
 
[27] The Sixth Circuit properly recognized a problem with reverse 
payment agreements, but erred in their analysis on why the agreements are 
anticompetitive.  The court, noticing the anticompetitive nature of the 
agreement, created a presumption that reverse payment agreements are per 
se anticompetitive because the patent holder made a payment to the 
generic to delay its market entry.121  The court was correct to find the 
agreement anticompetitive, but only because litigation between the 
companies continued. 122  The continued litigation allows the generic 
company to hold onto the 180-day exclusivity, preventing additional 
generic companies from entering the market.123  Because at that time a 
court decision triggered the 180-day exclusivity, and a reverse payment 
                                                 
116 See id. 
 
117 See id. at 905. 
 
118 See id. at 907 n.12, 908. 
 
119 See In re Cardizem, 332 F.3d at 907 n. 12, 908. 
 
120 See id. 
 
121 See id. at  910. 
 
122 See id. at 907 & n.12. 
 
123 See id. 
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agreement with continuing litigation prevented all other generic 
companies from entering the market.124 
 
B.  Reverse Payments are Presumed Valid and Not 
Anticompetitive 
 
[28] Expressly rejecting the Sixth Circuit’s analysis, the Second Circuit 
in In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litigation held that a reverse payment 
agreement is presumed valid and not anticompetitive.125  The court 
reasoned patent holders have a lawful monopoly and thus no competition 
would result between the companies because of the patent.126  The court 
presumed the reverse payment was not anticompetitive unless the patent 
was obtained through fraud or sham on the patent office.127  The court also 
determined that the presumption may be overcome if the agreement 
extends beyond the exclusionary scope of the patent at issue.128  Here, the 
settlement agreement between the patent holder and the ANDA filer ended 
the ongoing litigation and did not extend beyond the life of the patent.129  
Thus, the agreement was presume not to violate antitrust laws.130 
 
[29] The Second Circuit places a high priority on a patent’s 
presumption of validity without addressing the scope of the patent.131  The 
Second Circuit bases the presumption that the reverse payment agreements 
are not anticompetitive because a patent is involved and patents are 
                                                 
124 See In re Cardizem, 332 F. 3d at 907 & n.12. 
 
125 In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 213 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 
126 Id. at 212-13. 
 
127 See id. 
 
128 Id. at 213. 
 
129 See id.. 
 
130 See In re Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 218. 
 
131 See id. at 211. 
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presumed valid.132  The problem is that a patent’s claim may be valid but 
too narrow to exclude a particular product.133  To determine whether the 
patent covers the generic drug, the court must define the claim, determine 
scope of the claim, and find whether the generic drug infringes the 
claim. 134  This is the only way to determine if the reverse payment 
agreement is a lawful extension of the patent.  The court must move 
through the patent claim construction before deciding the anticompetitive 
nature of the agreement. 
 
C.  Look to the Patent’s Exclusionary Scope First 
 
[30] The Eleventh Circuit in Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. reversed a district court’s holding that a reverse 
payment agreement was per se anticompetitive.135  The court remanded 
the district court to incorporate in the anticompetitive analysis a patent 
holder’s rights and protections granted by the constitution.136  The 
Eleventh Circuit reasoned that reverse payment agreements are not per se 
anticompetitive, so long as the agreement is not broader than the 
exclusionary effects of the disputed patent.137  The court recognized that 
patents are a general exception to antitrust liability, but the exception is 
limited to the scope of the patent.138  The Eleventh Circuit instructed the 
                                                 
132 See id. 
 
133 21 U.S.C. §355(j)(2)(A)(iv) (2006) (certifying that the related patent is invalid or the 
generic drug will not infringe the related patent).  See generally 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2006) 
(discussing patent infringement). 
 
134 See In re Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 212-13 (stating that competition can only be 
restrained “within the scope of the patent”, implying that the scope of both patents needs 
to be examined to determine infringement). 
 
135 See Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1304 (11th Cir. 2003). 
 
136 See id. at 1312. 
 
137 See id. at 1309. 
 
138 See id. at 1312. 
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lower court to analyze the scope of the disputed patents before 
determining the anticompetitive nature of the agreement.139  Once a court 
determines the metes and bound of the patent, the court can determine 
whether the settlement agreement extends beyond it.140  On remand, the 
lower court addressed the exclusionary scope of the patent and found that 
the agreement was per se illegal because the patent was likely invalid.141 
 
[31] Congress should adopt the Eleventh Circuit’s analysis.  It properly 
takes into account the legal monopolistic effects of patents, without over 
emphasis on the presumed validity or scope of the patents.  The Sixth 
Circuit is at one extremeit assumes that a payment from a patent holder 
to a generic company to delay entry is proof that the patent alone is not 
strong enough to exclude the drug.142  The Second Circuit is at the 
opposite end of the spectrumit assumes that the patent is valid and that 
its scope covers the drug unless fraud was committed on the patent 
office.143  The Second Circuit relies on the presumption of a patent’s 
validity without determining the scope of the patent claims.144  The 
Eleventh Circuit takes the middle-ground approach by determining the 
scope and validity of the patent at issue and using it to determine whether 
the reverse payment agreement is a lawful extension of the patent.145  In 
analyzing these agreements, Congress should adopt the Eleventh Circuit 
approach for similar determinations because it properly takes a patent’s 
exclusionary effect without giving over emphasis to its presumed validity 
of the its scope. 
                                                 
139 See id. 
 
140 See Valley Drug, 344 F.3d at 1312-13. 
 
141 See In re Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 352 F. Supp. 2d 1279, 1298, 1306–
07 (S.D. Fla. 2005). 
 
142 See In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896, 915 (6th Cir. 2003). 
 
143 See In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 212-13 (2d Cir. 2005). 
 
144 See id. at 212-13. 
 
145 See Valley Drug, 344 F.3d at 1312-13. 
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[32] A proper analysis helps courts determine whether the reverse 
payment is anticompetitive once entered into, but does not prevent them 
from occurring.  Pharmaceutical companies’ incentives to create these 
agreements and delay subsequent ANDA filers from entering the market 
remain.  Patent holders still have an incentive to retain monopoly profits 
and pay generic companies to postpone entry in the market.  Generic 
companies have an incentive to collect money from the patent holder to 
retain more money than companies would manufacturing and selling the 
generic drug.  Because two parties to the underlying suit have the same 
objective—keeping the reverse payment agreement intact—Congress 
needs take the initiative to amend the Hatch-Waxman Act to discourage 
future anticompetitive agreements. 
 
D.  Senate Bill S. 27 Addresses the Symptoms Instead of the 
Sickness 
 
[33] Congress’s recent proposal falls short of addressing the real issue 
with reverse payment agreements: the misbalanced incentives in the 
Hatch-Waxman Act.  In addition, the bill attempts to codify an incorrect 
analysis in determining whether the agreements are anticompetitive.  As a 
first priority, Congress should focus its efforts on correcting and amending 
the incentives in the Hatch-Waxman Act to discourage anticompetitive 
reverse payment agreement from forming by amending the 180-day 
exclusivity provision.  As a second priority, Congress should mandate how 
courts analyze the anticompetitive nature of the agreement. 
 
[34] Congress needs to change the incentive encouraging generics to 
challenge brand name patents.  The 180-day exclusivity provides this 
incentive, but when combined with a reverse payment acts as a blockade 
to additional generic companies entering the market.  The first ANDA 
challenger may prevent other generics from obtaining FDA approval until 
the ANDA challenger markets its drug.146  The reverse payment delays the 
generic’s market entry, the 180-day trigger, and thus all other generics are 
                                                 
146 See Upadhye, supra note 94, at § 13:9. 
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prevented from entry until 180-days after the ANDA challenger’s 
exclusivity period begins.147  As discussed in the next section, Congress 
can by creating an additional triggering event—entering into a reverse 
payment—to encourage generics to challenge brand patents without 
blocking all generic competition.  This would effectively prevent reverse 
payment agreements from forming. 
 
[35] Congress, in Senate Bill S.27, proposes a new process for 
analyzing reverse payment agreements.148  The bill creates a presumption 
that reverse-payment agreements are anticompetitive.149  The bill grants 
the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) the ability to police these 
agreements with its own proceedings using this presumption.150  To 
overcome the presumption, the parties to the agreement must show the 
agreement has more beneficial effects than harmful anticompetitive 
effects.151  The parties must prove this by a clear and convincing 
standard.152   
 
[36] The bill proposes an incorrect anticompetitive determination.  The 
bill’s analysis and presumption is almost identical to the Sixth Circuit’s 
presumption against the agreements.153  It disregards the legal 
                                                 
147 See Ankur N. Patel, Delayed Access to Generic Medicine: A Comment on the Hatch-
Waxman Act and the “Approval Bottleneck,” 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1075, 1095 (2009). 
 
148 See Preserve Access to Affordable Generics Act, S. 27, 112th Cong. § 3(a) (2011), 
available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-112s27rs/pdf/BILLS-112s27rs.pdf. 
 
149 See id. (explaining that an agreement is presumed anticompetitive if the ANDA filer 
receives anything of value and agrees to limit research or other necessary steps to get the 
drug to market). 
 
150 See id. 
 
151 See id. 
 
152 See id. 
 
153 Compare Preserve Access to Affordable Generics Act, S. 27, 112th Cong. § 3(a) 
(2011), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-112s27rs/pdf/BILLS-
112s27rs.pdf, with In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896, 908 (6th Cir. 2003). 
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exclusionary scope of disputed patents.154  Patents provide the owner the 
ability to exclude others from making, using, or selling a product covered 
by the patent.155  This is an express exception to antitrust laws granted by 
the Constitution and must be incorporated into the analysis.156 
 
[37] Congress should follow the Eleventh Circuit’s analysis.  The 
Eleventh Circuit looked at the exclusionary effects of disputed patents 
before determining whether a reverse payment agreement is 
anticompetitive.157  The court reasoned that a patent is a constitutional 
exception to antitrust law.158  A patent holder may exclude others from the 
market so long as their patent rightfully grants the right.159  Here, the bill 
unconstitutionally ignores a patent holder’s rights by creating a 
presumption against reverse payment agreements.160  Congress should 
remove the presumption against reverse payment agreements and look at 
the disputed patents first to take into account this express exception to 
antitrust laws.  In addition, instead of having the FTC making the 
determination, Congress should leave it to the courts to decide as an 
impartial decision maker unaffected by administration change.   
 
VI.  THE VACCINE APPROACH: LONG TERM PREVENTATIVE AND 
PROACTIVE LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS 
 
                                                                                                                         
 
154 Preserve Access to Affordable Generics Act, S. 27, 112th Cong. § 3(a) (2011), 
available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-112s27rs/pdf/BILLS-112s27rs.pdf. 
 
155 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2006). 
 
156 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 
157 Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1312 (11th Cir. 2003). 
 
158 See id. at 1309. 
 
159 See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2006). 
 
160 See Preserve Access to Affordable Generics Act, S. 27, 112th Cong. § 3(a) (2011), 
available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-112s27rs/pdf/BILLS-112s27rs.pdf. 
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[38] To rid consumers of the anticompetitive illness, the courts have to 
utilize the proper anticompetitive analysis and Congress must pass 
working incentives.  Two solutions are proposed.  The first proposal 
transfers one of Congress’s original competitive incentives to the next in-
line ANDA filer to encourage competition beyond the first generic 
company.  The second proposal is for Congress to mandate the Eleventh 
Circuit approach to properly analyze whether reverse payment agreements 
are anticompetitive. 
 
A.  180-day Exclusivity Pass-Through 
 
[39] Congress originally created the 180-day exclusivity period to 
incentivize generic companies to challenge brand name patents by 
providing the first mover advantage.161  However, the 180-day exclusivity 
blocks other generic companies from FDA approval until the first generic 
filing a paragraph IV certification commercially markets its drug.162  In 
the reverse payment agreement, the generic agrees to delay marketing its 
drug preventing it from triggering the 180-day exclusivity.163  Until the 
180-day exclusivity is transferred, all other generics are blocked from 
obtaining FDA approval.164  Only the first generic filing an ANDA with a 
paragraph IV certification is able to use the right.165  Thus, Congress 
should allow the 180-day exclusivity transfer to the second ANDA filer 
upon a triggering event by the first ANDA filer to ensure that generic 
competition is not harmed. 
 
[40] Congress should make the 180-day exclusivity incentive 
transferrable to the next ANDA filer based on a reverse payment-
                                                 
161 See H.R. REP. NO. 98-857(I), at 14–15 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, 
2647. 
 
162 See Upadhye, supra note 94, at § 13.8. 
 
163 See id. at § 13.9. 
 
164 See id. 
 
165 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)(iii) (2006). 
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triggering event.  The current legislation provides the exclusivity only to 
the first ANDA filer that makes a paragraph IV certification.166  Congress 
should allow the exclusivity incentive to pass from the first ANDA 
challenger to the second ANDA challenger, once the first has entered into 
a reverse payment agreement.167  This would encourage patent holders and 
the first ANDA challenger to weigh the cost of entering into reverse 
payment agreements against manufacturing the drug without 
compromising the competitive generic market.  The transfer of the 
exclusivity would remove the FDA approval barrier because the second 
ANDA challenger now wields the barrier for the other generic’s entry into 
the market. 
 
[41] In order to determine whether the 180-day exclusivity has 
transferred, Congress must require pharmaceutical companies to register 
all reverse payment agreements with the FDA.  This will provide notice to 
the FDA providing it the ability to inform the next ANDA paragraph IV 
challenger of its new rights. 
 
[42] The exclusivity pass-through should transfer only to the first three 
paragraph IV ANDA challengers and then open the availability of FDA 
approval to all generics.  If the second ANDA challenger enters into a 
reverse payment agreement, then it would trigger the transfer of the 180-
day exclusivity to the third ANDA challenger.  If the third ANDA 
challenger enters into a reverse payment, then the exclusivity would not 
transfer, opening the FDA approval roadblock to all subsequent ANDA 
filers. 
 
[43] It is important to limit the exclusivity pass-through to the first three 
challengers otherwise pass-through exclusivity would act as a continuous 
                                                 
166 See id. 
 
167 See Henry Butler & Jeffrey Jarosch, Policy Reversal on Reverse Payments: Why 
Courts Should Not Follow the New DOJ Position on Reverse-Payment Settlements of 
Pharmaceutical Patent Litigation, 96 IOWA L. REV. 57, 124 (2010).  Mr. Butler and Mr. 
Jarosch provided this as an afterthought solution to their article.  Here, we will explore 
this idea more in depth.  Later in this section we will explore this in conjunction with a 
proper court analysis of reverse payments. 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology     Volume XVIII, Issue 4 
 28 
blockade.  In theory, if the exclusivity pass-through was not limited it 
could delay generic competition further.  Imagine the 180-day exclusivity 
transferring through the first nineteen ANDA challengers because the first 
eighteen challengers entered into reverse payment agreements.  Each 
ANDA challenger would receive the 180-day exclusivity when the ANDA 
challenger before it entered into a reverse payment.  This would block 
generic market from other generics until 180-day after one generic uses 
the exclusivity.  This could prevent generic market entry longer than the 
current process.  
 
[44] Congress has contemplated a similar idea in 2009, but Congress 
has yet to approve the proposed bill.168  The 2009 bill suggested that a 
subsequent ANDA challenger may share the exclusivity period with the 
first challenger if the subsequent ANDA challenger succeeds in its 
challenge against the patent holder. 169  Alternatively, if the patent holder 
does not initiate a lawsuit against a subsequent ANDA challenger, then 
that ANDA challenger may earn exclusivity.170  Since multiple 
challengers may succeed against the patent holder, multiple challengers 
may earn and share the 180-day exclusivity.171  When multiple companies 
share the exclusivity period, the companies lose the first mover advantage 
over the entire 180-day period.  More importantly, it creates multiple 
market participants lowering the price of the drug more than if there were 
only the patent holder and one generic in the market.172  A lower price of 
the drug means that the multiple generics earn less than if only one generic 
                                                 
168 See Drug Price Competition Act of 2009, S. 1315, 111th Cong. (2009); Butler & 
Jarosch, supra note 166 at 122. 
 
169 See Drug Price Competition Act of 2009, S. 1315, 111th Cong. (2009); Butler & 
Jarosch, supra note 166, at 123. 
 
170 See Drug Price Competition Act of 2009, S. 1315, 111th Cong. (2009); Butler & 
Jarosch, supra note 166, at 123. 
 
171 See Drug Price Competition Act of 2009, S. 1315, 111th Cong. (2009); Butler & 
Jarosch, supra note 166, at 123. 
 
172 See Generic Competition and Drug Prices, supra note 39. 
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was in the market, which lowers the generics potential profits.173  This 
weakens the generic drug companies’ incentive to challenge the brand 
name in the first place.174 
 
[45] In contrast, the pass-through exclusivity proposal is triggered upon 
the first ANDA challenger entering into a reverse payment agreement.  
The pass-through exclusivity option ensures only one generic 
manufacturer may use the exclusivity period.  It allows a generic filer to 
reap the maximum benefit from being the sole generic drug in the market 
for 180-day period providing it with the ability to sell the generic drug at a 
higher price.  In addition, it provides the sole generic drug company with 
the first mover advantage.  The incentive for a generic drug company to 
challenge the brand name’s patent must be strong to encourage generic 
drugs to file for approval and lower its risk for market entry. 
 
[46]  The pass-through proposal provides flexibility to patent holders 
and the first ANDA challenger with limited harm to competition.  The 
solution does not eliminate the ability for brand and generic companies’ to 
enter into reverse payment agreements.  It provides the companies the 
option of using these agreements as effective solutions to their patent 
disputes.  In addition, Congress would incentivize subsequent generic 
filers to enter the market, when previously they were prevented or 
discouraged.  Previously, if the first ANDA challenger did not use the 
180-day exclusivity then neither could a subsequent challenger.  The pass-
through proposal ensures that the 180-day exclusivity is accessible to other 
generics companies if the first does not use it.  Since the incentive is 
accessible to a subsequent challenger, it provides an incentive to a 
subsequent challenger to file an ANDA application and enter the market. 
 
B.  A Proper Court Diagnosis System 
  
[47] Congress should mandate the Eleventh Circuit’s approach in 
analyzing reverse payments.  This mandate would ensure that the courts 
                                                 
173 See id. 
 
174 See id. 
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have a uniform and proper analysis of reverse payments.  It is important 
that Congress provide this mandate to analyze anticompetitive agreement 
that the first proposal does not prevent. 
 
[48] The courts must look at the exclusionary scope of the patent before 
making the determination of the anticompetitive nature of a reverse 
payment agreement.175  Courts must presume the patent is valid and 
cannot discard its exclusivity.  But a valid patent is far different than a 
valid reverse payment agreement.  A court must compare the patent’s 
claims to that of the ANDA filer’s drug to determine whether drug falls 
within the scope of the patent claims.  If ANDA drug falls directly within 
the scope of a valid patent claim then the reverse payment agreement has a 
high likelihood of being a valid extension of the patent.  If the ANDA 
drug does not fall within the scope of a patent claim, then the reverse 
payment has a low likelihood of being a valid extension of the patent.  The 
court then must weigh the strength and scope of the patent in with the 
traditional antitrust analysis.  
 
[49] It is critical that Congress establish a pass-through 180-day 
exclusivity and mandate the Eleventh Circuit’s reverse payment analysis.  
The pass-through exclusivity proposal ensures generic filers are 
incentivized to challenge brand name patents encouraging competition in 
the market and removing the drug approval bottleneck for future generics.  
The pass-through exclusivity proposal prevents anticompetitive reverse 
payments by removing the approval bottleneck.  Under the new proposal, 
if the first three generic challengers enter into reverse payments, then the 
approval bottleneck is removed for all other generic companies. 
 
[50] However, the pass-through proposal does not prevent all reverse 
payment agreement.  It only removes the 180-day exclusivity bottleneck to 
reduce the number of reverse payment agreements that are 
anticompetitive.  In order to discourage anticompetitive reverse payments 
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that the pass-through proposal fails to prevent, Congress must mandate the 
analysis set forth by the Eleventh Circuit. 
 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
 
[51] Encouraging innovation over competition provides more value to 
society than the other way around.  Both are important and so Congress 
must implement a proper balance to ensure one does not overwhelm the 
other.  Congress attempted to implement a balance between competition 
and innovation in the pharmaceutical industry with the Hatch-Waxman 
Act.176  Congress rewarded the first generic with a 180-day exclusivity to 
obtain a first mover advantage.177  But Congress drafted the generic 
exclusivity legislation in a way that harmed the subsequent generic filer 
from competition.  The first generic filer to challenge the patent holder 
could enter into an agreement and not trigger its 180-day exclusivity.178  
Until the challenger triggered the exclusivity by marketing the drug, a 
subsequent filer could not gain approval from the FDA to market its own 
version.179  Forcing the first generic challenger to pass the exclusivity 
right to the next generic challenger increases competition and provides the 
second generic challenger with greater incentive to make the drug.  The 
most important change Congress can make is to remove the generic 
exclusivity bottleneck through a legislative amendment to prevent 
companies from forming reverse payment agreements that are 
anticompetitive.  Secondly, Congress needs to mandate the Eleventh’s 
Circuit approach in analyzing whether reverse payment agreements are 
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anticompetitive to analyze reverse payment agreements that the first 
proposal fails to prevent. 
